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ABSTRACT 
As digital media give increasing power to users—power to reproduce, share, remix, and 
otherwise make use of content—businesses based on content provision are forced to either turn to 
technological and legal means of disempowering users, or to change their business models. By 
looking at Lockean and Kantian theories as applied to intellectual property rights, we see that 
business is not justified in disempowering users in this way, and that these theories obligate e-
business to find new business models. Utilitarian considerations support disempowering users in 
this way in some circumstances and for the time being, but also show that there is a general 
obligation to move to new business models. On these moral bases, as well as on practical bases, 
e-business ought to refrain from using the legally permitted strong copyright protections, and 
should instead find ways of doing business which support, value, and respect the technical 
capabilities that users have gained. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the most ethically contentious areas of e-business is the assertion and enforcement of 
intellectual property rights by businesses based upon content provision. Businesses engaged in 
content delivery tend to view themselves as sellers of goods rather than service providers, and this 
difference in perspective has significant social, practical and ethical implications. By debunking 
the idea that strong copyright over content in a digital context is morally supported on Lockean or 
Kantian considerations, and by shifting the burden of proof on economic and utilitarian 
considerations against those who employ strong forms of copyright, the chapter demonstrates that 
there is generally a moral obligation to refrain from use of standard (or, maximalist) copyright 
protection in e-business. Thus, businesses based upon content provision should, for both moral 
and practical reasons, change their business model from the product to the service economy. 
While it is well established in U.S. law that sweat-of-the-brow does not generate goods subject 
to copyrighting, there is still a strong intuition that a moral, if not a legal right over expressive 
works is generated through labour. By an investigation of the Lockean presumption against the 
right of exclusion, we can see that a viewpoint true to Locke’s moral emphasis on the 
preservation of freedoms held within the state of nature would not support such a right given the 
current structure of digital media. Indeed, Locke himself, even though he wrote in a far different 
communications context, supported only limited intellectual property rights, which he justified on 
a utilitarian, not a labour-desert basis.  
The Kantian basis of intellectual property rights is approached next. The Kantian view centers 
on author’s rights, and is far removed from the current legal regime in place in the U.S. and 
spread internationally through the World Intellectual Property Organization, but again speaks to a 
strong intuition that a moral, if not a legal right to exclusion is generated in expressive works. 
Here, by looking at Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals, as well as his essay “On the Wrongfulness of 
Unauthorized Publication,” we see that the moral basis of the right of exclusion is founded upon 
the communicative relationship between an author and her public, and offers no support to the use 
of strong copyright law in our current communications context. Instead, a Kantian perspective 
would today support open-content models utilizing public domain dedication or GPL/Creative 
Commons licensing. 
Finally, a utilitarian perspective—the explicit basis of intellectual property rights in the 
Anglo-American legal tradition—is considered. The moral basis being found in consequences 
rather than in natural or moral rights, the great success of the open-source movement is the 
primary consideration. By looking at recent history, it can be seen that the practical necessity of a 
right of exclusion over expressive works within our current communications context is suspect at 
best. The primary utilitarian considerations holding weight today have to do with the large role 
played by copyright-based industries in our economy, and the disutility that would be caused by 
undermining the basis of these industries. This consideration, while important, is counterbalanced 
by considerations of the loss of public rights required by the use of strong copyright. 
Several examples of currently marginal but emerging business models are then presented, 
including shareware, subscription, patronage, and value-added delivery models. These examples 
illustrate how a conceptual shift in content-delivery-based e-business from a product to a service 
model is able to satisfy practical utilitarian and economic considerations while remaining true to 
Lockean and Kantian moral considerations. In conclusion, it is argued that e-business has an 
obligation, on the grounds previously explained, to refrain from the use of legally available strong 
copyright protection.  
 
BACKGROUND 
 The current debate over copyright is a tangled mess. Concerns with individual and corporate 
rights are intertwined with concerns about economic and social effects, and within each of these 
kinds of concerns there are a great number of stakeholders whose interests are not readily ranked. 
The rights in question include those of various parties who may or may not be the same person: 
the author, the creator, the copyright holder, the purchaser, the consumer, the licensee, and the 
user. Within larger societal concerns, the field is no less crowded: we are concerned with the 
freedom of the market, the freedom of the culture, and the freedom of expression; and also with 
the benefit of the public, of the entertainment industry, of the national economy, and of the 
entrepreneurial impulse. We are rightly committed to all of these concerns, and the majority of 
differences in opinion between those who argue the strength of copyright protection should be 
diminished and those who defend full use and continuation of current copyright protections arise 
from little else than different views on the relative importance of these concerns. Ought we to 
view the rights of the author as determinative of the rights of the user, or the licensee? Ought we 
to view a largely corporate-owned culture as an acceptable price to pay for the health of our 
economy? To what extent does encouraging innovation through profit motive justify 
governmental protection of industry practices which disable free use of purchased goods, or 
which infringe upon the privacy of consumers and users? 
 In order to decide these issues, we tend to fall back to established positions. This takes place 
both practically and intellectually. Practically, we often respond to these shifts in architecture—to 
use Lawrence Lessig’s term (2006)—by attempting to fit applications of technologies into the 
ruts already worn by previous architectures, maintaining the economic relations, rights, and 
privileges required by previous technical regimes. The movement towards Digital Rights 
Management (henceforth DRM) systems is straightforwardly an attempt to make the new media 
act like the old in order to keep stable the power relations between content producers, business, 
and the market. Intellectually, we also fall back to established positions; in the realm of copyright 
in particular, we fall back upon Lockean, Kantian, and utilitarian foundations of intellectual 
property rights. 
The constitutionally granted power of Congress "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries" (Federal Convention of 1787) has usually been interpreted 
in a strictly utilitarian manner. For example, we see Justice O’Connor’s statement that “the 1976 
revisions to the Copyright Act leave no doubt that originality, not “sweat of the brow,” is the 
touchstone of copyright protection in directories and other fact-based works” (Feist Publications 
v. Rural Telephone Service, 1991). This interpretation reinforces the implication, based upon the 
optional nature of Congress’ granting of intellectual property protection, that the law recognizes 
these author’s and inventor’s rights as artificial rather than natural, as stated before by Chief 
Justice Hughes: “copyright is the creature of the federal statute passed in the exercise of the 
power vested in the Congress. As this Court has repeatedly said, the Congress did not sanction an 
existing right, but created a new one” (Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 1932). Nevertheless, it seems 
that Lockean intuitions may underlie recent legislative action, particularly the automatic 
extension of copyright over works already created provided in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term 
Extension Act of 1998 (henceforth CTEA), and the extreme length of the term created thereby. 
Justice Breyer’s dissent in Eldred v. Ashcroft (2003), while it did not claim that the CTEA 
emerged from Lockean intuitions, provided many strong arguments that go towards establishing 
such a claim, such as that the CTEA would extend copyright terms to such an extent that these 
rights would serve the interest of providing income for authors and their descendents at the 
expense of public commerce in ideas and expressions, thus promoting to an unprecedented extent 
intellectual property owners’ right of exclusion—the right to prevent others from utilizing 
intellectual property (henceforth IP) for profit, non-profit, or personal purposes—over the social 
and utilitarian benefits of releasing those rights. 
These various foundations of intellectual property rights (henceforth IPR) are rational ones, 
and even if the motivation to provide IPR protection falls outside of the utilitarian intent that 
seems implied within the constitution, it is certainly possible that the legislation may still be 
constitutional even as the motivation behind it is not. These various foundations have, indeed, 
been part of the public dialog about IPR for some time, and our interest in non-utilitarian 
justifications of IPR did not emerge from obscurity with the rise of digital media. And yet, the 
shifting architecture of the methods of articulation of IP provides radical new possibilities to 
authors, users, and owners of IP, and as we return to our Lockean, Kantian, and utilitarian 
intuitions, it is worthwhile to reconsider basic forms of the theories which underlie those 
intuitions in this new and changing social/technological milieu. What we find is remarkable. 
In the following reconsideration of these theories, I attempt to provide evidence that, when we 
consider copyright protection over digital objects, not only can these traditional sources of 
justifications of IPR not be presupposed, but instead that, when digital objects are considered 
properly, the burden of proof ought to fall upon the copyright maximalists rather than the 
copyright minimalists. In this discussion, since I am trying to address what e-business should do 
today, the copyright minimalist and maximalist positions will not be approached as positions on 
the law—e.g. whether copyright terms should be extended to life of the author plus seventy years, 
as they are under the CTEA, or reduced to the earlier term of fourteen years, as in the Copyright 
Act of 1790—but instead only as positions on how to use the legal structures currently in place. 
In this context, the copyright maximalist position can be defined as the position which holds that 
it is appropriate to use the strongest copyright protection allowed under current law; a simple “all 
rights reserved” assertion of copyright. The copyright minimalist position, which I advocate here, 
can be defined as a position which holds that only a weaker protection can be morally justified, 
such as those provided by Creative Commons licenses or the GNU Public License. These less 
extensive uses of copyright law allow users to retain various rights, such as the right to share or 
reproduce content with attribution, the right to remix for non-commercial use, or the right to 
access and use source code so long as the resulting software is shared alike. 
The case argued here is a limited one in a few important ways:  
First, I do not hold that any of these ethical theories are right or wrong, or that any is more 
important than any other. I discuss these because they are the theories that most strongly 
influence public opinions and beliefs, regardless of how well- or ill-founded they are on a moral, 
philosophical, or constitutional basis. It is for this reason that I consider these perspectives rather 
than others, which may arguably be more correct, useful, or productive.  
Second, I am addressing digital media, and digital media alone. Issues about analog IP in an 
increasingly digital world are beyond the scope of this inquiry.  
Third, I address only copyright, and not other forms of IPR. Digital technologies have 
transformed IPR of all kinds in important ways, but only in the realm of copyright have they 
brought about widespread public skepticism regarding the justice of providing such rights. Thus, 
it is here that our intuitions seem to have the greatest—or at least most apparent—mismatch with 
current law.  
Fourth, I will not discuss international issues in IPR legislation, but will concentrate on U.S. 
copyright law.  IPR varies in significant ways in different nations, and enforcement varies even 
more, but U.S. copyright-based industries have been particularly aggressive in trying to export 
U.S. laws to other nations, both through industry groups such as the Business Software Alliance 
and the Recording Industry Association of America, and through the World Intellectual Property 
Organization. For this reason, U.S. law is of particular global relevance.  Nevertheless, in order to 
maximize the relevance of these arguments to all parties in global e-business, I will not 
concentrate on legal structures, but instead the moral arguments that may or may not serve as a 
foundation to a variety of legal structures. 
Fifth, and finally, I will not deal extensively with contemporary reformulations, 
rehabilitations, or reconstructions of the canonical ethical theories discussed. As valuable and 
powerful as such contemporary theories are, my intention here is not to prove that these theories 
are unable to support strong copyright protection, but rather to show that the basic intuitions 
which emerge from each of these traditional justifications of IPR are tied in important ways to 
pre-digital media. My goal is simply to shift burden of proof by raising doubts from within 
canonical versions of these theories, and for this, we need not show that such proof cannot be 
given.  
 
THE ETHICS OF COPYRIGHT OVER DIGITAL GOODS 
We will consider Lockean, Kantian, and utilitarian justifications of copyright in the light of 
digital modes of articulation. In order to avoid biased terminology, I will often refer to intellectual 
goods rather than intellectual property. Locke and Kant both offer rights-based justifications of 
intellectual property laws. When considering both Locke and Kant, we will see that their theories 
no longer imply a moral right that requires legal protection, and this will be sufficient to show 
that there is therefore no justification to use these legal protections, since they limit the rights and 
freedoms of others. Utilitarianism, however, even if it does support strong copyright, does not do 
so by asserting a moral right, but only because the granting of such an invented right of exclusion 
over intellectual goods is for the best for society as a whole. Here, it will be shown that this 
“copyright bargain” is questionable, but, due to the consequentialist reasoning involved, it can 
only be asserted that the burden of proof should be on those who would use strong copyright 
protection, not that such use will always be unjustifiable. 
 
The Lockean Perspective 
It is often suggested that the writings of John Locke—specifically the second of his Two Treatises 
on Government—may provide a justification for strong copyright laws, and public intuitions 
supporting IPR are often based upon Locke’s labour-desert theory of property rights. A critical 
investigation of the Lockean theory, taking digital media into account, reveals that it no longer 
supports the idea of a natural right which corresponds to copyright protection, and that it instead 
affirms the natural right to copy and to produce derivative works. 
 The famous and most oft-quoted passage, from Chapter V: Of Property (Locke, 2005), is as 
follows: 
 
Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every man has a 
property in his own person: this no body has any right to but himself. The labour of his 
body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he 
removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour 
with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It 
being by him removed from the common state nature hath placed it in, it hath by this 
labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other men: for this 
labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right 
to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good, left in common 
for others. (Ch. V, §27) 
 
"Mixing" of one's labour with the goods of the world, given to mankind in common by God, 
implies a right to the fruits of that labour, for, as Locke argues later, "if we will rightly estimate 
things as they come to our use, and cast up the several expenses about them, what in them is 
purely owing to nature, and what to labour, we shall find, that in most of them ninety-nine 
hundredths are wholly to be put on the account of labour" (2005, Ch. V, §40). If we follow Locke 
in holding that the value in the product springs from the labour mixed therein, and that the labour 
therein is by nature property of the labourer, the labourer then has a natural right to the value of 
the product with which he has mixed his labour. 
 This theory is a fine one when speaking of acorns and apples; when your labour provides you 
a good which has a use to you, whether that good emerges merely from collection of the bounty 
of nature or an industrial use of natural resources, you certainly have a moral claim over such a 
good. The idea that this theory can be applied to intellectual property, wherein what is collected 
and worked is not seed and soil but rather ideas, sounds, words, or facts of nature, is not an 
irrational one. It might additionally be argued that, the labour of the creation of such a good being 
of such a greater proportion than the labour involved in the subsequent utilization of it by parties 
other than the author, the author should retain a proportional right over such derivative works. 
This is certainly the viewpoint which has guided our extension of the Constitutional allowance of 
the ability of Congress to provide protection over "Writings and Discoveries" to the arguably 
extra-constitutional (cf. e.g. S. Vaidhyanathan, 2003) ability of Congress to legislate protection over 
works derivative of these writings and discoveries. There is, indeed, support from Locke (2005) 
on this point, for he argued that  
 
[h]e that had as good left for his improvement, as was already taken up, needed not 
complain, ought not to meddle with what was already improved by another's labour: if he 
did, it is plain he desired the benefit of another's pains, which he had no right to, and not 
the ground which God had given him in common with others to labour on, and whereof 
there was as good left, as that already possessed, and more than he knew what to do with, 
or his industry could reach to. (Ch. V, §34) 
 
Thus, if I should have words, ideas, sounds or facts of nature available to me which are as 
good as those already taken up by others, I have no right to meddle with those already improved 
by others. The Beatles do not have dominion over the sounds of which their music is made, and 
should I wish to make music of my own I have as much access as they to those sounds, and 
therefore have no right to trespass upon the particular ways in which they have been already 
cultivated. 
We may first note a serious disanalogy that presents a problem for this application of Lockean 
property theory: digital objects, and songs in general, are non-rivalrous goods. When I take your 
acorns or apples, your cultivated land or, indeed, your book, my benefit is a rival of yours; I gain 
only through your loss. When I make a copy of your digital file or when I sing your song, you are 
not the less for it. Thus, when I copy software you have written, for example, I do not trespass 
upon your right to the fruits of your labour—I have in no way prevented you from reaping the 
benefits of your cultivation of mathematical facts.  On the other hand, when you prevent me from 
sharing your music, making use of your source code, or remixing your movie, you prevent me 
from reworking those materials and being recognized for my addition of my labour. 
It may be objected that I have lessened the profits that you might have realized through the 
sale of copies. This argument, however, is ex post facto and has no place here, for it already 
assumes that you have a right to control such copies, and this supposed right is precisely what is 
in question. Nevertheless, copies and derivative works are certainly a means of benefiting by the 
labour of another, and it may yet be that we owe to the author some share in the benefit we have 
therefrom taken. 
 If we should, for example, remix a Beatles song, we mix an amount of our own labour with 
the sounds, words, and ideas with which they have already mixed their labour. But these sounds, 
words and ideas are not found within virgin untouched nature. Do the Beatles then owe a portion 
of their benefit to, for example, the descendants of those who contributed to the invention of the 
modern guitar? To assert so would be ludicrous. The appropriation of the guitar has become akin 
to the appropriation of a fact of nature, for, just as Locke said regarding untamed nature, such 
appropriation being non-exclusive, it keeps nobody else from profiting from her own 
appropriation of the guitar. As Locke (2005) worded it: 
 
Nor was this appropriation of any parcel of land, by improving it, any prejudice to any 
other man, since there was still enough, and as good left; and more than the yet 
unprovided could use. So that, in effect, there was never the less left for others because of 
his enclosure for himself: for he that leaves as much as another can make use of, does as 
good as take nothing at all. No body could think himself injured by the drinking of 
another man, though he took a good draught, who had a whole river of the same water 
left him to quench his thirst: and the case of land and water, where there is enough of 
both, is perfectly the same. (Ch.V, §33) 
 
 The Beatles do not infringe upon the natural rights of the inventors of the guitars they used, 
for they have not taken anything from them, or deprived them of anything whatsoever. They, 
further, have taken nothing from the commons by taking the instrument for their own use, for 
they in so doing have kept nobody else from doing likewise. The same can be said of a later artist 
using the music of the Beatles. DJ Dangermouse, for example, has taken up the work of those 
before him, mixing the Beatles’ White Album and Jay-Z’s Black Album in his Grey Album, but he 
has done so in a non-rivalrous, non-exclusive way, leaving, in effect, as much commonly 
available after as before his appropriation.
1
  
 It may be that we wrong the authors in some other way by such appropriation, but we do not 
tread upon their property rights in a Lockean perspective. For Locke, what is questionable is 
exclusion. This is necessary with regard to goods whose possession is rivalrous and exclusive, 
such as land, and it is this necessity that motivated Locke's attempt to justify holding property. As 
Locke (2005) stated:  
 
it is very clear, that God, as king David says, Psal. cxv. 16. has given the earth to the 
children of men; given it to mankind in common. But this being supposed, it seems to 
some a very great difficulty, how any one should ever come to have a property in any 
thing. (Ch. V, §1) 
 
If you have mixed your labour with elements of the earth held in common, you have, he 
concludes, a natural right to possess that cultivated good. If that good is, however, of a kind 
which does not require exclusion in order for you to reap profits from it, the superaddition of 
exclusion can find no justification in Locke, for Locke seeks only to justify the necessary evil of 
exclusion, not to justify exclusion when wholly unnecessary. Thus, you have a natural right to the 
song that you write: I ought not to deprive you of the lyrics you have written down. However, 
you have no right to tell me not to sing it. 
Tom Bell (2004) has put the point more generally: 
 
[C]opyright and patent protection contradicts Locke's justification of property. By 
invoking state power, a copyright or patent owner can impose prior restraint, fines, 
imprisonment, and confiscation on those engaged in peaceful expression and the quiet 
enjoyment of the tangible property. Because it thus gags our voices, ties our hands, and 
demolishes our presses, the law of copyrights and patents violates the very rights that 
Locke defended. (p. 4) 
 
 If you should write a computer program, you have a right to object if I destroy your copy. In 
just the same way, if I should copy your program, I have taken nothing from you, and you have 
no right to keep me from free and full use of my copy of this program. We talk about property 
rights as a “bundle” which may or may not include certain particular rights, such as the right to 
exclude others from one’s property, to use it, to profit from it, to rent it, or to sell it. Locke 
provides a strong defense of some rights in some ways, but his theory offers no support for the 
extension of the right of exclusion over copies of digital objects. 
 
The Kantian Perspective 
It may be argued that a Kantian justification for the extension of copyright over digital objects 
may be given on the basis that if we consider the maxim “I intend to copy this digital object” we 
shall find that it is not universalizable, for if everybody copies digital goods, nobody will be able 
to afford to produce further originals to copy. Furthermore, it may be argued that doing so does 
not respect the creator of the digital object as an end to herself, but treats her merely as a means. 
An additional Kantian justification of the extension of copyright over digital objects, one more in 
line with the continental European legislative tradition of author’s rights, might be given in the 
argument that such objects are often or always expressive in nature, and the protection of the data 
which constitutes an authorial expression is required if the integrity of that expression is to be 
adequately protected. These arguments will be addressed in this order. 
 First, we ask, following Nissenbaum (1995), whether the maxim to copy my neighbor’s 
software is universalizable. It seems to many people that such behavior is equivalent to theft,
2
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this ignores the non-rivalrous nature of digital objects. 
Kantian moral theory claims that unethical actions are those which fail to accord with what 
Kant calls the "categorical imperative":  That the maxim (or, the rule that one implicitly follows 
in the action) should be capable of being willed as a universal law of human behavior.  So, 
approximately, we can ask whether it is possible for all other actors to take the same action we 
are considering.  If it is not possible, or if a world in which everyone acted in such a manner 
would be undesirable, then we can tell that we are making an exception of ourselves in this 
action.  We can consider this action beneficial only because most others refrain from doing as we 
are doing.  Hence, Kant claims that when we cannot will the maxim of our action as a universal 
law, we are using others for our benefit.  
Consider theft of some useful analog object from my neighbor. When I take valuable property, 
I am thereby given a good, and my neighbor loses an identical good. In one version of the famous 
Kantian argument I steal from my neighbor and thereby gain a loaf of bread, which is fine and 
good, but we discover that this is unfortunately not universalizable, for if everybody stole bread 
then those in possession of bread would stop leaving it out in the open where people can get at it, 
or perhaps bakers would stop making it altogether. 
 When I copy my neighbor’s digital object, I am thereby given a benefit, and my neighbor is 
none the less for it, for digital objects are similar to an idea in that, in Thomas Jefferson’s (1813) 
words, “he who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine.” 
For this reason already, we see that the categorical imperative does not provide as strong an 
argument against copying of digital goods as it does against the seizure of analog goods. If 
everybody copied their neighbors’ digital goods, this in itself should in no way cause any 
reticence on anybody’s part, unless it can additionally be reasonably expected that such an 
imagined law of nature would preclude the creation of further such goods, or would so greatly 
diminish their number or quality that we could not will to live in such a world. To make this more 
clear, consider Christine Korsgaard’s (1996) restatement of wherein the wrongness of an immoral 
action lies according to Kant: “your action would become ineffectual for the achievement of your 
purpose if everyone (tried to) use it for that purpose” (p. 78). 
 Perhaps, although my neighbor is not directly harmed by my action, I am nevertheless using 
others because I am neglecting to support authors of digital objects, and the corporations that 
employ them, in order to allow for the continued creation of such products. The question then is 
whether, if everybody copied digital objects, new digital objects would continue to be created. 
The answer here is quite clear: there would be no shortage of digital goods. It is true that the 
profitability of large-scale digital good production would be greatly diminished, but this is not the 
only source of digital goods. The software released as freeware, under GNU general public 
license, under open-source BSD license, or otherwise copylefted, is sufficient to replace a wide 
variety of proprietary programs, and the availability of the source code of proprietary programs 
would provide ample resources to increase the number of such non-proprietary applications, and 
quite likely at an higher rate of increase than that provided through production under fully 
proprietary licensing. Similar licensing is being applied to other digital goods, such as music, 
video, and written works, and many authors feel that these licenses are preferable to standard 
copyrighting, which tends, in many important ways already discussed, to discourage innovation 
and creation. Thus, we see again that the categorical imperative, in its first formulation, is not at 
odds with the maxim to copy my neighbor's digital objects. 
 It may be objected that the maxim should read instead “I intend to copy proprietary digital 
objects whenever convenient,” for the above confuses the copying of freeware or copylefted 
goods, which is equivalent to accepting a gift or continuing a conversation, with the piracy of 
commercially produced content, which is arguably equivalent to theft.  
 Admittedly, I have a duty to respect the law, as I cannot consistently will that everybody 
should break the law whenever they find it convenient to do so. This does itself establish a 
Kantian argument against so-called piracy, but not by means of any particular aspect of the action 
itself. In further support of this position, we may note that the creators of these digital products 
had a reasonable expectation of profit from its resale, and to deprive them of that profit which the 
law guarantees them would treat the programmers and corporate managers and CEOs as a mere 
means, for they no doubt have life plans which are dependent upon the income which our 
unlawful behavior would deprive them of. We are in a system wherein they are playing by the 
established rules, and for that reason, we have a duty to hold up our end of the bargain. 
 This is of course a conservative Kantianism, for it would be possible to argue that we never 
consented to this system in any meaningful sense, or perhaps that one ought not respect 
legislation which requires behavior which is immoral, an allegation which some have argued. 
Most notable is Richard Stallman's argument that copyright in fact requires us to act immorally 
and erodes basic social goods, an argument which he brings together by the slogan “cooperation 
is more important than copyright” (2004). A more modest line is taken by Helen Nissenbaum 
(1995), who argues that at least some situations exist in which it is moral to ignore copyright. The 
most comprehensive argument along these lines of which I am aware is Michael Perelman's Steal 
this Idea (2002), which makes a book-length case against intellectual property rights in general. 
Even if we stay true to the conservative Kantianism, and respect laws in place simply because 
they are the laws in place, this is an ex post facto justification, for it tells us nothing about 
whether the law supports or inhibits moral behavior. If the copying of proprietary digital goods 
cannot be shown to be wrong outside of the fact of its illegality, we should conclude that it is 
wrong in the way that sitting at a whites-only lunch counter may have once been wrong: to 
transgress here is to neglect a duty to be lawful but is otherwise acceptable behavior, and thus the 
law itself should be considered questionable. If the transgression of this law violates no duty 
other than that of lawfulness, and if this law does not continue to fulfill the obligation in the 
service of which it was created, then we will conclude that copying proprietary digital objects is 
indeed immoral, but we must also conclude that making use of this law through asserting strong 
copyright is itself immoral, for it unnecessarily restricts the freedom of others. 
When we look at the goals stated in the enactment of copyright law in the Anglo-American 
tradition, the justifications are (1) to ensure that the author of a useful expression is benefited, or 
at least not ruined, (2) to encourage the creation of such works, and thus (3) to benefit the public 
in general.
3
 If we ignore, for a moment, the existence of digital media, we easily see a Kantian 
justification of such legislation. If we consider the creation of a useful and successful complex 
expression, say a manual of some kind, the production of this expression presumably requires a 
fair amount of labour while its reproduction requires relatively little. In this case, if we 
universalize the maxim of freely reprinting useful expressions, we see that this practice would not 
be sustainable, for nobody would find it worth their while to create such expressions. Thus, 
copyright law does have a clear and significant moral basis, especially if we also consider that to 
discourage such expressions would constitute a purposeful impediment to the realization of 
human potentialities, as in accord with Kant's third example in the second section of the 
Groundwork, 4:423 (1996a, pp. 74-5). 
When we again take digital media into consideration we see that the law no longer has this 
moral basis, for the free reprinting/reproduction of digital goods can now be willed as a universal 
law. With regard to the obligation to assist the creator of such useful expressions, (1) above, we 
may easily note that the expenditures required in the creation of such complex expressions as 
software are no longer prohibitive, as evidenced by the fact that significant and increasing 
numbers of such creators choose not to receive recompense for their labour even when given the 
legal means to do so, and, further, that such recompense, in the cases of software and music at the 
least, is not limited to retail sales in its origin, but can profitably be shifted into the service 
economy, as will be discussed further below. This itself is enough to establish that objectives (2) 
and (3) no longer require these laws, but it is worth noting that there is also significant evidence 
that copyright over digital objects is not only unnecessary but actually detrimental, discouraging 
both innovation and the public benefit which is to be gained from such innovation (e.g. Nadel, 
2004; Perelman 2002). 
We find more concrete discussion of the issue in Kant's article “On the Wrongfulness of 
Unauthorized publication of Books” and the related arguments in The Metaphysics of Morals.
4
 
Kant argues that writing does not constitute a plain object, but is instead also a form of speech, 
and thus an expression of the will of the author. Then there is the fact that the author chooses a 
certain publisher, a certain provider of the “mute instrument for delivering the author's speech to 
the public” (1996c, p. 30), which can then carry out the will of the author in the name of the 
author. This means that another publisher which would publish without authorization would 
express the will of the author in his speech, yet would do so against the will of the author, for the 
author cannot authorize more than one publisher to carry his expression to the public. 
It is this last point that is least obvious and most crucial. Specifically, the argument is that the 
author cannot authorize more than one publisher as the instrument of their speech for “it would 
not be possible for an author to make a contract with one publisher with the reservation that he 
might allow someone besides to publish his work” (1996c, p. 31), because the two would “carry 
on the author's affair with one and the same entire public, [and] the work of one of them would 
have to make that of the other unprofitable and injurious to each of them” (1996c, p. 31). So, the 
author as a matter of fact cannot actually authorize two publishers to publish their speech, for no 
publisher would agree to such an arrangement. It is for this reason that another publisher cannot 
assume the permission of the author, for that permission cannot be granted, and thus they would 
bring the speech of the author to the public against the possible will of the author. 
What is remarkable about this argument is that the claim of the authorized publisher against 
the unauthorized publisher is guaranteed by the impossibility of the consent of the author; an 
impossibility, but not a logical impossibility. We see, further, that with regard to digital objects 
this is no longer an impossibility, and thus the majority of the argument simply does not apply to 
digital objects. 
Now we ask: Is it possible for an author of digital objects to authorize multiple publishers? 
Yes, it clearly is, for publishers need not be in competition with one another, though they speak to 
the same public, for they may not charge for the product at all. This conflict only arises with 
regard to proprietary digital goods. 
Furthermore, Kant (1996c) argues that “if someone so alters another’s book (abridges it, adds 
to it, or revises it) that it would even be a wrong to pass it off any longer in the name of the author 
of the original, then the revision in the editor’s own name is not unauthorized publication and 
therefore not impermissible” (p. 35)
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 It seems this Kantian source does not support the kind of 
closed-source proprietary license currently prevalent, but instead supports only a license no more 
restrictive than the GNU GPL (General Public License), for if an adaptation is potentially 
sufficiently differentiated to be appropriately considered an independent work, then to prohibit 
the use of the first expression in the creation of an ex hypothesi different expression would clearly 
be outside of the realm of the author’s rights.  
So it seems that Kant may be used to support the judgment that it would be wrong to copy 
proprietary digital objects, for this could potentially be the act of a distributor acting in the name 
of the author, but against the will of the author. But it is far less clear that Kant would support 
making digital objects proprietary to begin with, since this is no longer necessary to express the 
communication of an author to her public. Even if Kant does not disallow making such goods 
proprietary, his writing and reasoning clearly does not support closed-source licensing, and even 
directly ridicules the very idea of contributory infringement.
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 So, on the basis of these arguments, 
it seems that Kant would require us to respect the chosen distributor of an expression unless the 
author authorizes multiple or unlimited distributors, but that authors and rightsholders are not 
justified in preventing the public from access to and use of code, or from the creation of 
derivative works.  
 
The Utilitarian Perspective 
Utilitarianism claims that the moral action is the action which produces the greatest net benefit 
for all parties involved. The utilitarian view, being based on the consequences for happiness or 
suffering, validates talk of "rights" only as a means to an end. Even fundamental rights, such as 
freedom of speech, are viewed as having an instrumental value rather than an absolute 
justification.  Still, on a utilitarian view, some things, such as freedom of speech, are viewed as 
being so essential to happiness that they should not be abridged except in the most extreme cases.  
Hence, the utilitarian will claim that we should have a robust "right" to free speech because 
without it our society would be dysfunctional, ruled by prevailing opinion no longer subject to 
criticism, and we would feel unable to develop and express ourselves. 
 A utilitarian view of property rights in general is similar. Without the ability to own property, 
and the right to exclude others from use or enjoyment of it, we would lack many assets which 
seem to be basic to human happiness, ranging from the ability to enjoy the fruits of our labour to 
the inability to be secure in our plans for the future. If there is a utilitarian basis to rights over 
intellectual goods, there must be similar widespread and basic benefits for us, either individually 
or as a society. As we have already discussed, though, digital goods are non-rivalrous, so this 
right cannot be based on our individual ability to keep possession of our creation, for copies and 
derivative works do not remove our copies from our possession. Instead, a justification must 
instead come from a larger social benefit produced through the provision of this legal protection. 
 The most basic utilitarian intuition behind copyright protection is that the profit motive 
mobilized by the granting of a temporary monopoly provides a greater diversity and amount of 
intellectual goods to the public. Closely allied to this is the claim that such goods will be of 
higher quality, for producers of such goods will be better able to make investments of money and 
time, due to the possibility of remuneration granted through the artificial monopoly created by 
copyright, amounting to a market-based system of patronage.
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 This is what is referred to as the 
"copyright bargain":  The right of exclusion is granted, for a limited time, not because there is any 
inherent benefit in this temporary monopoly, but because the temporary public loss of the right to 
use that copyrighted material is counterbalanced by a public benefit when that material falls out 
of copyright protection.  This, of course, is only a good bargain when the goods produced remain 
of greater balance after the copyright term expires than the immediate value of the (presumably 
fewer and worse quality) goods which might have been produced in the absence of this legal 
protection. 
 The "copyright bargain," it seems, may have hitherto been a good deal for the public on the 
whole, however, with the widespread availability of digital technologies, it is possible for 
independent members of the public to produce goods of similar utility to those produced by the IP 
industries, and the production of these goods is not dependent upon granting a right of exclusion, 
due both to increasingly effective alternate methods of mobilization of profit motive and to the 
increasing relevance of non-profit-based motives as production costs fall. The utilities given to 
the public by the “copyright bargain” may now be realized in the absence of copyright to a far 
greater extent, and thus the concrete benefit of copyright protection has been lessened. 
Concurrently, the social cost of effective copyright enforcement has risen—i.e. the “copyright 
bargain” is ever more onerous to the public in terms of opportunity costs, loss of freedoms, and 
imposition of externalities. Finally, it is reasonable to expect technological progress to continue to 
lessen the benefit of copyright protection relative to the absence of such protection, and to 
continue to increase the social costs of such protection. 
The most basic and intuitive version of a utilitarian argument in favor of copyright goes 
approximately as follows. An exclusive right granted through copyright allowed for works to be 
created that would otherwise not have been. The expense required by producing and distributing 
copies of creative works was such that collective action was necessary; this was accomplished 
through granting the right of exclusion to authors, such that it could then be granted to 
corporations that were able to bear the costs of manufacture and sale which the author could not 
bear herself. Additionally, this has allowed for greater expenditures of both time and money on 
the part of the author, as publishing houses and their equivalents are able to use profits from other 
authors and prior works to speculatively support the creation of new works through book 
advances, record deals, upfront payment of actors, regular employment of software engineers, and 
so forth. Through this profit-based production, corporate support allows for the creation of works 
far more costly than would otherwise be produced. The concrete benefit which the public gains 
through these works form the basis of the copyright bargain as usually understood. The 
superadded value to these cultural products relative to those which would be produced in the 
absence of the collective advantage provided by corporate actions—be this benefit in terms of 
artistic or entertainment value, or simply in terms of the volume of works created—is meant to 
counterbalance the loss of rights to the public in their use of these works, which loss is mitigated 
by the temporary nature of this loss of rights. This bargain was, of course, a better deal for the 
public in the past, both due to the more limited term of copyright that was in place and to the far 
greater necessity of involving profit-motivated concentrations of capital. 
The harms caused to the public by the "copyright bargain" rise sharply with widespread 
increased technological capabilities. As the means of production of industries based on 
intellectual goods have come increasingly within the possession of the public, industrial and 
private employment of ideas have become increasingly indistinguishable. It is impossible to tell 
whether I have sent somebody a music file as a form of private communication, as I might tell 
somebody about a book in recommending its purchase, or whether I have sent the music file as a 
form of industrial manufacture, as if I had manufactured a book in order that its purchase should 
be unnecessary. The priority of the industrial interpretation has been codified in law under the No 
Electronic Theft (NET) Act and, thus, the public is subjected to the strict requirements with 
which corporations were originally burdened in order to benefit the public. These basic forms of 
sociality are at risk, for as our lives become increasingly involved with digital technology, my 
inability to lend my neighbor a copy of e.g. some software, becomes an increasingly significant 
intrusion of business concerns into interpersonal and community relationships (Nissenbaum, 
1995). The shrinking scope of fair use is, of course, also a significant concern, as it becomes 
increasingly difficult through DRM for the end-user to do simple space- and time-shifting, 
especially as DRM is given legal protection through the anti-circumvention provisions (§1201) of 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. 
In order to enforce the artificial monopoly granted to the copyright holder, increasingly 
significant intrusions must be made on the public. The public is limited in use, sharing, and 
enjoyment of cultural artifacts, and even the astronomical fines imposed seem insufficient to deter 
copyright infringement.  From this, we should not simply conclude that music- and file-sharers 
are incapable of properly weighing risk and reward, but we should consider instead that sharing 
elements of culture with others may represent a human good as basic as freedom of speech, and 
that the file-sharer simply would prefer to put herself at risk of bankruptcy than to submit to a 
legal system which disallows her from this basic form of sociality.  
These attempts at enforcement, furthermore, are not only onerous but also ineffective; perhaps 
doomed. In a global communications context, files can simply be hosted in localities where IPR 
are either weak or weakly enforced.  The only options for a truly effective enforcement involve 
either (1) convincing the public that they ought not share, download, or remix IP, (2) spreading 
strong copyright law and strong copyright enforcement throughout all wired nations, or (3) 
monitoring individual internet connections to search for infringing packets.  The first option 
seems both undesirable and unlikely: as noted above, sharing culture may be a human impulse 
basic to our social existence, and to convince the public otherwise may be difficult, and may be 
accomplished only at the expense of freedom of expression and a feeling of community.  The 
second option seems an insurmountable task, unless strong moral arguments can be given why all 
nations should adopt strong copyright protection, and, as I have argued, sufficiently strong moral 
arguments may be lacking.  The third option requires a thoroughgoing invasion of public rights 
that is hard to imagine could possibly represent the greatest good for the greatest number. The 
feeling of surveillance is deeply unsettling, and injurious to our privacy and security—no amount 
of big-budget movies and new pop singles seems to outweigh the disutility of knowing that our 
communications are being monitored. 
Although the industrial dependence on strong copyright protection carries these disutilities, 
any lessening of the use of copyright protection may carry with it significant upheaval in IP-based 
industries, and these disutilities on the other side of the equation must be considered as well. We 
cannot ignore that the industrial production of culture employs a great many Americans, and thus 
supports many families and provides a driving force in our national economy. Intellectual 
products provide emotionally and economically rewarding work to a great many—not just studio 
and label heads, actors, musicians, programmers, and writers, but also caterers, personal 
assistants, studio musicians, limousine drivers, costume designers, best boys, lawyers, and 
lobbyists—and are a major export commodity, most notably in the movie, music, and software 
industries. As industry lobbyist Jack Valenti once hyperbolically stated this point, “By leading all 
other manufacturing sectors in their contribution to the American marketplace, the copyright 
industries are this nation’s most treasured assets . . . Protection of our intellectual property from 
all forms of theft, in particularly [sic] online thievery and optical disc piracy, must take precedent 
[sic] if the United States is to continue to lead the world’s economy” (Motion Picture Association 
of America, 2002). 
It is, however, one thing to argue that utilitarian considerations support copyright protection 
simpliciter, and quite another to argue that utilitarian considerations support the status quo due to 
the disutility of social upheaval that may follow from an otherwise beneficial change in policy—
especially if a similarly disutile social upheaval is required by the maintenance of the status quo, 
due to the shifting architecture discussed above. Indeed, on a strictly economic basis the structure 
of intellectual property lends itself to public production and ownership, even considered 
independently from the social and legal costs necessitated by enforcement given public 
availability of the relevant means of production. Intellectual property based products, as they 
have a high fixed cost and a negligible marginal cost, are of a type of good whose production 
costs are best socialized rather than left to the private sector. As Michael Perelman (1991) stated, 
 
[w]ithin [Kenneth] Arrow’s logic, computer software is an ideal public good. Once 
produced, software code costs virtually nothing to duplicate. One can even read Arrow’s 
analysis of the economics of information as an economic justification for the piracy of 
computer software; that is, software piracy, generously interpreted, approximates the 
price structure that pure neo-classical economics implicitly recommends, assuming that 
software vendors are marketing nothing more than the information embodied in the 
program. (p. 194) 
 
This is not the place to ask about whether it is best to create intellectual goods through market 
forces, however. Our question here is whether utilitarian considerations justify using the strong 
copyright laws currently provided. If the utilitarian defense of our current IP legal regime is 
simply that we are dependent upon it, rather than that it is and will continue to be for the greatest 
good, then we are perhaps justified in continuing to use copyright, but only if we do so in a way 
that minimizes and our dependence upon it, and minimizes the burdens placed upon end users and 
consumers. If this is right, in other words, we are economically dependent upon a system which 
will cause increasing social harms, and the proper solution is to decrease our dependency until we 
can afford to no longer cause these harms.  
There is an ancient and probably apocryphal story about Hero of Alexandria. Having invented 
a steam engine—an aeolipile, he called it—he went to his king, excited by its great productive 
potential. The king saw this as a problem, rather than a solution. “What,” he asked, “would we do 
with all the slaves?” In a situation where we are economically dependent upon a legal regime, and 
technological changes make that regime unjustifiable, we should not use the disutility of social 
upheaval as a reason to avoid change. The situation here is of course less morally dire, but 
structurally similar. To continue using strong copyright is to continue our dependence upon an 
increasingly harmful legal regime, and, therefore, while it may be justifiable in some cases and 
temporarily, the burden of proof in any particular case should be against those who would argue 
that strong copyright is for the best, especially when enforced through DRM. 
 
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
Shareware licensing represents a viable business model that is currently underutilized. Those 
illegally downloading music or movies often state that if they find something they truly enjoy, 
they will buy the CD or DVD in order to support the artists. This is nothing but a spontaneous 
public employment of the shareware model over currently proprietary goods. Musicians such as 
John Mayer and Jonathan Coulton have used online distribution networks in order to gain 
notoriety, and established musicians gain from the so-called “piracy” of their back catalogue, as 
Janis Ian has noted (2005). Many artists already produce most of their profits from live 
performances, and the diminution or elimination of copyright laws would aid this by reducing the 
artificial scarcity in reproductions of music, thereby freeing expendable income to be spent on 
entertainment to be given over directly to artists. Some artists such as Radiohead and Trent 
Reznor have decided to make their music freely downloadable, and have shown that it is possible 
to regard the musician as the provider of a service, supported through ticket sales, donations, and 
upselling, rather than as the provider of a product (the album or track) for sale. There is no reason 
that these methods of utilizing an open-source shareware model, already successful in some areas 
of music and software development, could not be adapted to other kinds of intellectual 
production. As public radio demonstrates, there is no need to ensure that each and every user pays 
for a service in order to be able to fund the provision of that service to all who wish it. 
A sponsorship model of funding is another underutilized strategy, and one which provides a 
patch to one of the major problems of the shareware model: the risk inherent in speculative 
creation of a good requiring a significant financial outlay. An example of sponsorship funding 
can be found in Maria Schneider’s Grammy-winning album “Concert in the Garden.” The album 
was produced through artistShare.net, which offers artists the ability to offer fans the opportunity 
to sponsor the production of works, similar to the way in which institutions or individuals might 
commission a work, but on something closer to a grass-roots model. As Maria Schneider put it, 
“This project was funded with the help of my fans and distributed entirely through my own 
website. I feel very proud of taking that first step and incredibly grateful that it has proven to 
work so well!” (AllAboutJazz.com, 2004). The artistShare model could equally well be applied to 
other areas of intellectual production, allowing businesses currently dependent upon sales for 
income to find an alternate and sustainable source of revenue. 
The shift from a sales- to a service-based business model is already emerging in various ways 
in the marketplace. In software, Red Hat offers the clearest example of the potential for growth in 
this business model, and Richard Stallman (2004) has argued for this as a more general economic 
model. Red Hat has enjoyed great success selling subscriptions, support, training, and 
customization of open-source and free software. As open-source and uncommodified software 
becomes more prevalent, we can expect demand for software servicing to increase perhaps 
precipitously, not only because of the obvious challenges of implementation or the obvious 
advantages of customization, but because of liability issues. One of the great benefits which 
software service providers are able to offer businesses is the ability to take a share of legal 
liability in cases of software-based damages, such as compromised client personal information or 
data loss. In this way, software service firms are able to act as informational insurance brokers, 
offering a greater degree of financial security, in addition to the improved data security which 
customization and a direct service relationships offer, as compared to centralized, mass produced 
software sellers. 
MIT’s OpenCourseWare provides a similar example of rethinking intellectual property as 
something to be serviced rather than sold. MIT OpenCourseWare 
 
• Is a publication of MIT course materials 
• Does not require any registration 
• Is not a degree-granting or certificate-granting activity 
• Does not provide access to MIT faculty (2007) 
 
When MIT first started this open-source approach to their course materials, which makes 
available online all manner of information from syllabi to lecture notes to tests, there was 
reportedly some confusion about why MIT would give away the very goods it was in the business 
of selling. As Hal Abelson (2004) explained at an academic open-source conference, MIT 
decided the information covered in a course was not a competitive good with enrollment within 
that course—MIT, in other words, does not view itself as a seller of information, but rather as a 
supplier of services, which include not only access to information, but also presentation of that 
information within a particular environment of other students, accessible and responsive 
professors, labs, discussion groups, and various other educational resources. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Now that the means of industrial production of intellectual property are firmly in public hands, 
any reasonable assessment of the future of monopolistic and exclusive employment of intellectual 
goods will include increased regulation and encroachment upon the everyday lives and personal 
activities and projects of the public at large. The public is already denied many benefits of 
intellectual goods. As technological advances continue, these denials will have to become more 
extreme as means of circumvention become more powerful. Furthermore, the benefits which 
these denials remove from the public will become greater as the productive abilities which would 
otherwise be in public hands increase in power and as their application continues to expand in 
breadth through the increasing range of uses of digital technology. In the absence of any moral 
right of authors requiring the right of exclusion—a moral right which the Lockean and Kantian 
perspectives no longer supply—this increasing disutility is unjustifiable. 
Given recent technological advances, the copyright bargain removes significant benefits from 
the many in order to benefit the few, and furthermore does so by inflicting harms upon the many 
by restricting basic rights, by breaking down social bonds, and by preventing the public from 
freely realizing their creative impulses. Given the likelihood that such advances will continue, we 
can expect both the benefits lost and the harms gained to steadily and continually increase. 
Whatever benefits the copyright bargain still provides may be nearby and certain, but they are 
impure, and the harms brought about through the copyright bargain are nearby, certain, fecund, 
and wide-ranging. 
As e-business models emerge, and as businesses increasingly become e-businesses, 
entrepreneurs, managers, and others involved in business have a responsibility to find revenue 
models which are not dependent upon asserting unjustified rights and removing rights and 
freedoms from others. There are many such models, as discussed in the foregoing, but the 
business environment is currently in flux, and these models are unstable.  There are surely other 
such models yet to be developed. There are, however, some principles that businesses should 
follow. 
Given that consumers are now producers and distributors; given that anyone can create, edit, 
publish, and remix intellectual goods; and given that the technical capabilities of the public are 
likely only to further increase, businesses that wish to survive as content providers must 
recognize that they can no longer be gatekeepers, and that they need to ask what they have to 
offer the consumer, rather than asking what they deserve from the consumer. Members of the 
public must be treated as partners and clients, not consumers. This is the primary principle I 
would suggest for how to use copyright in an ethical and sustainably profitable way: think 
service, not product. Digital media means consumers do not need content producers anymore: 
they can produce their own content if you make yours too difficult to use, restrictive, or otherwise 
unattractive. Don’t ask how to get your user/audience to pay to access content; ask what you can 
do to make them value your business and the service you provide in that content delivery. 
How can you do this?  
 
1. Don’t tell your customers how to enjoy your product.  
2. Open discussions, don’t close them. 
3. Remember that the user is supporting you, even if she might not be paying to do so 
 
Don’t lock users into a particular device or software program if you don’t have to. Don’t make 
them feel like you’re trying to take their information, privacy, or ability to choose. It’s 
unjustifiable, and the public is increasingly unwilling to put up with it, even if it is legal. Both 
morally and practically, it’s a bad way to do business. Give them the freedoms they need to enjoy 
your service on their own terms. Give them the opportunity to support you because they like your 
service and your content rather than trying to force them to support you if they want access or 
use. This is a time of great opportunity for e-businesses based in content provision, but only if 
business can respond in a positive and proactive way to technological changes; can recognize and 
respect the power that users now have; and chooses to treat the user base as partners, whether or 
not they have paid for the privilege of popularizing your content and bringing you publicity. 
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END NOTES 
                                                
1 The argument I have presented in this section is based on the “enough and as good” portion of the 
Lockean proviso.  For a valuable alternate approach, based upon the spoilage proviso, see Gordon Hull’s 
“Clearing the Rubbish: Locke, the Waste Proviso, and the Moral Justification of Intellectual Property” 
(2009).  
2 E.g. “Piracy is theft, and pirates are thieves, plain and simple. Downloading a movie off of the Internet is 
the same as taking a DVD off a store shelf without paying for it” (Motion Picture Association of America, 
2005). This false identity has in important ways been codified in American law under the No Electronic 
Theft Act of 1997 (henceforth, the NET Act). This act, besides implicitly equating copyright infringement 
and theft through its very name, strikes a provision in 17 U.S.C. § 506 which formerly required commercial 
advantage or private financial gain as a criterion for a criminal infringement offense. Under the law as 
modified by the NET Act, criminal infringement may be established by the willful reproduction or 
distribution of copyrighted material of a total retail value exceed $1000 within any 180 day period or by the 
receipt of commercial advantage or private financial gain. Further, the NET Act added a creative definition 
to 17 U.S.C. §101, stating that "the term 'financial gain' includes the receipt, or expectation of receipt, of 
anything of value, including the receipt of other copyrighted works" (U.S. Department of Justice, 1998). 
This definition states that the receipt of copyrighted works is an illegal financial gain, thereby implying that 
piracy is a form of theft.  
3 As stated in the Statute of Anne: 
"Whereas printers, book sellers, and other persons have of late frequently taken the liberty of printing . . . or 
causing to be printed . . . books and other writings without the consent of the authors or proprietors of such 
books and writings, to the very great detriment, and too often to the ruin of them and their families; for 
preventing therefore such practices for the future, and for the encouragement of learned men to compose 
and write useful books; may it please your Majesty ..." (Parliament of England, 1710) 
Cf. also Constitution of the United States, Article 1, §8, clause 8 (Federal Convention of 1787). 
4 The Metaphysics of Morals does not add anything of significance to these issues to his earlier comments 
in "On the Wrongfulness [etc.]." For those who wish to compare the two, or who do not have easy access to 
the less common essay, the argument addressed in following is presented in briefer form in The 
Metaphysics of Morals, §31, II., 6:289-91 (1996b, pgs. 437-8). 
5 This idea is also present in both French and German law (Assemblée nationale française, 1997; Deutscher 
Bundestag, 1997). 
6 In a surprising footnote, Kant asks rhetorically "Would a publisher really venture to bind everyone buying 
the book he publishes to the condition that the buyer would be prosecuted for misappropriating another's 
goods entrusted to him if the copy sold were used for unauthorized publication, whether intentionally or 
even by negligence?" (1996c, p. 29fn). This now may constitute “contributory infringement,” wherein one 
may be found guilty of copyright infringement simply by offering assistance to the practice of copyright 
infringement in situations in which the abettor knew or ought to have known of the infringing activities. 
This was a primary charge in the Napster case (A&M Records v. Napster, 2001), and has since been used in 
threats directed at individuals, universities, and internet service providers. 
7 A more complete list of possible utilitarian justifications might look like this: copyright protection, in 
exchange for an acceptable loss of social freedoms, (1) provides a greater diversity and amount of 
intellectual goods to the public, (2) allows for creation of goods requiring a huge initial investment, which 
would not otherwise be produced, (3) allows for profit-motivated responsiveness to the desires of the 
public, (4) diminishes search costs on the part of users/consumers through effective marketing and 
distribution, (5) effectively and efficiently preserves and distributes older and less popular goods of cultural 
value, (6) provides rewarding labour to many Americans, (7) represents a valuable export good for the U.S. 
market, (8) discourages wasteful rent-seeking expenditures. Here, I only am able to address the most 
central intuitions about a utilitarian justification of IPR: that the copyright bargain is necessary to 
adequately encourage socially and economically foundational production. Landes and Posner (2003) 
discuss all of these possible utilitarian justifications, including those that are less obvious or intuitive, 
however they note that “while we discuss a number of issues relating to intellectual property rights in 
computer software and to the impact of the Internet on intellectual property law, readers who believe that 
these are the central issues of that law today will be disappointed with our coverage” (p. 7). 
